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Abstract 
This article considers processes of urban development within the context of mega-event 
preparations in Rio de Janeiro. We begin with a brief overview of these development 
processes, highlighting their connections to political and economic change in recent years. 
Proponents of these mega-event-led initiatives argue that Rio is undergoing a period of 
inclusive growth and integration: a perspective we call here a ‘Post-Third World City’ 
narrative of urban renewal. Critics, however, contend that urban officials are harnessing 
mega-events (e.g., the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games) to push forward a 
neoliberal agenda of socially unjust policies benefiting the interests of capital and 
marginalising the city’s poor and especially its favelas (i.e., the “City of Exception” thesis, 
Vainer, 2011). In this article we explore the insights of these two perspectives and consider 
why they have grown popular in recent years. Though we side generally with the City of 
Exception thesis, we argue that important geographic and historical particularities must also 
be accounted for. Without carefully situating analytical perspectives empirically – in 
particular, cases in which theoretical models are drawn from European and North American 
contexts – urban researchers risk concealing more than they reveal in analyses of rapidly 
developing countries like Brazil.  
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A “Post-Third World City” or a neoliberal “City of Exception”? 
Rio de Janeiro in the Olympic era 
 
 
 
1) Introduction 
 
There are few neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro that reflect the city’s peculiar development 
history over the last century quite like Morro da Providência (Providence Hill). Situated near 
the Port Zone in the centre of the city, Providência, as it is known today, could aptly be 
described as Brazil’s oldest favela community (informal urban settlement). First occupied by 
veterans of Brazil’s Canudos War in 1897, Providência earned the nickname “Favela Hill” from 
its original inhabitants. The nickname quickly caught on, and by the 1920s, “favela” became 
synonymous with informal housing settlements all across Rio de Janeiro (Perlman, 2010). 
 
While Providência is certainly not Rio’s largest or best known favela neighbourhood, the 
community continues to lie at the forefront of important social and political changes. In 2010, 
a Police Pacification Unit (UPP) entered the favela to drive out the Comando Vermelho (Red 
Command) drug trafficking gang that had dominated Providência for decades. Although 
militaristic in their planning and tactics, UPPs have been deployed in a host of Rio’s favelas 
since 2008 with the aim of establishing a permanent police presence in favelas and thus putting 
an end to the cycles of violence accompanying the State’s hitherto dominant counter-insurgency 
doctrine (see Cano et al., 2012; Alves and Evanson, 2011).  
 
As well as reducing violence, advocates argue that these public security methods will create the 
conditions necessary for positive social and physical change in favelas. Indeed, several new 
policies have followed the UPP occupation of Providência. These include UPP Social, a post-
Pacification service improvement and integration initiative, and Morar Carioca (Carioca 
Living), an ambitious favela-upgrading programme intended to carry out major public works, 
most notably the installation of a new cable car and funicular train to improve mobility up the 
steep slopes. Meanwhile, the largest urban regeneration project in Brazilian history, Porto 
Maravilha (Marvellous Port), is turning the surrounding neighbourhood from a semi-
abandoned industrial zone into a mixed-use business and residential district (Sanchez and 
Broudehoux, 2013).  
 
Perspectives that emphasize the benefits of these changes constitute what we define in this 
article as a “Post-Third World City” narrative. According to this narrative, Rio’s current 
transformation is belatedly getting to grips with historic problems of weak urban integration, 
patchy public service provision, and endemic violence. This transformation, according to 
advocates, is being assisted by the city’s decision to host the 2016 Olympic Games, which have 
encouraged collaboration and investment from across the public and private sectors that might 
not otherwise have been forthcoming. Rio de Janeiro is not becoming a “First World City”, but 
its transformation is moving the city beyond the First/Third World dichotomy that underpinned 
scholarly analyses of its development during the second half of the twentieth century. 
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Providência and the Port Zone meanwhile, for so long bywords for inequality and exclusion, 
are to become the most potent symbols of Rio’s reinvention as a more integrated, more peaceful, 
more modern city. 
 
By 2015, however, much of the optimism that once surrounded these reforms has dissipated. 
As in other favelas, residents of Providência have complained of abuses by UPP officers, and 
drug traffickers continue to operate in the area (Granja, 2010). Meanwhile, the infrastructure 
projects threaten to evict a large number of residents, with estimates that as much as one third 
of the population might be relocated (Sanchez and Broudehoux, 2013: 137). To add insult to 
injury, many residents learned they were at risk of removal by returning to find the letters 
“SMH” (the acronym of the Secretaria Municipal de Habitação, or Municipal Housing 
Secretariat) painted on their outer walls. The opacity and inconsistency of the authorities have 
made it all but impossible for those affected to gain further information. And while the Porto 
Maravilha website argues the project “starts from the assumption that the current residents will 
remain in the port region”[i] (Porto Maravilha), this is unlikely given that most new housing in 
the port area is targeted towards high-income groups (Sanchez and Broudehoux, 2013: 143-48). 
Instead, many who live in Providência could be sent to the distant edge of the city where the 
majority of new low-income housing is being built.  
 
A growing body of critical academic literature, broadly following Carlos Vainer’s influential 
“City of Exception” thesis (Vainer, 2011), identifies such effects not only as inevitable, but as 
intended outcomes of the new urban policies. Vainer and others argue that the Olympic Games 
have created a “state of exception” (Agamben 2005), permitting the circumvention of legal 
protocol and citizen/human rights in the interests of global capital. As a result, they claim, the 
urban impacts in areas like Providência will not be integration – as promised by the Post Third-
World City narrative – but on the contrary securitisation and social cleansing of valuable and 
strategically important areas, creating a City of Exception urban landscape. 
 
The purpose of this article is to critically interrogate and compare the Post-Third World City 
narrative and the City of Exception thesis. The former argues that Rio is undergoing a period 
of inclusive growth and integration (led by mega-event initiatives and urban renewal), while 
the latter contends that urban officials are harnessing mega-events to push forward socially 
unjust policies that further marginalize Rio’s poor and working-class residents. It should be 
noted that these two perspectives are not directly analogous: the Post-Third World City 
narrative is essentially a government discourse with a degree of public resonance, while the 
City of Exception thesis is an academic critique (which has also influenced the tactics and 
rhetoric of oppositional social movements).  
 
Nonetheless we believe the exercise is a useful one that furnishes valuable analytical insights. 
Firstly, the two perspectives constitute the primary ‘big picture’ accounts that have sought to 
explain – and that have shaped public debates about – Rio de Janeiro’s current transformation, 
making them important in their own right. Secondly, both acknowledge Rio’s current “Olympic 
era” as a watershed moment, yet diverge significantly in how they interpret the effects of these 
changes. As such, they prefigure radically different futures for the city. Thirdly, the comparison 
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opens into wider academic debates, both about the relationship between mega-events and urban 
transformation (Poynter and Viehoff, forthcoming), and about the applicability of theoretical 
frameworks developed in the context of the urban Global North to analysis of cities in the 
Global South (Roy, 2009; 2011; Parnell and Robinson, 2012; Robinson, 2011). We believe that 
pursuing this analysis can therefore help to untangle the complex interactions between State, 
market, social groupings and urban space in the twenty-first century, particularly in countries 
like Brazil that are developing rapidly. 
 
We begin the article by providing general background and defining what we see as a loose but 
generally coherent “City Project” in Rio de Janeiro, before outlining the historical narrative, 
political language and policy influences that combine to form the Post-Third World City 
agenda. We then go on to review the emergent literature critiquing the City Project, with its 
emphasis on neoliberal economic strategies, competitive urban governance, and the catalytic 
role of global mega-events. The second half of the article offers an evaluation of these two 
perspectives and an elaboration of several important tensions and omissions that emerge from 
this. While we broadly side with the City of Exception critique, we argue that it fails to fully 
account for current processes of transformation in Rio de Janeiro. To achieve this we argue that 
three key factors must also be taken into account: (1) Elements of both complexity and 
continuity within the Brazilian State; (2) The uneven geographies of urban policy impacts; and 
(3) Long-term socio-spatial trends that are unfolding independently of the City Project. 
 
2) A “City Project”? 
 
The new generation of urban policies, including those intersecting in Providência, have 
appeared at a particular historical conjuncture. In 2003 Brazil emerged from recession and 
began a period of sustained growth, bringing an end to more than two decades of economic 
stagnation and instability. For Rio de Janeiro, which had fallen into relative decline since the 
1960s – losing its capital city functions to Brasília and falling further behind São Paulo as a 
centre of business and finance – the turnaround was even more pronounced (Urani and 
Gambiagi, 2011). The city began to attract new national and international business investment 
as its tourism, retail and construction sectors boomed. This was further bolstered by the 
discovery of large offshore oil fields in 2006. Falling unemployment levels, combined with 
federal income-supporting policies like the minimum wage and the Bolsa Família conditional 
cash transfer system, led to a marked fall in poverty during the first decade of the century, 
including in the city’s favelas (Rodrigues, 2013). 
 
In the political arena, Rio also passed a major watershed in 2008 when Eduardo Paes was 
elected Mayor on the ticket of the centre-right Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB). 
Another PMDB member, Sérgio Cabral, had been in office since 2006 as Rio de Janeiro State 
Governor, and the party was in coalition with then President Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva’s leftist 
Workers Party (PT) at the federal level (and remains so since the election of Lula’s successor 
Dilma Rousseff in 2010). As a result, Rio’s three tiers of government came into alignment for 
the first time since the return of democracy in the 1980s, with each holding a strong political 
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mandate. In October 2009, less than a year after Paes took office, Rio won its bid to host the 
2016 Olympic Games, with strong backing from both parties. 
 
The successful Olympic bid provided extra impetus, resources and co-ordination to policies 
already being implemented at different levels, as well as permitting the development of entirely 
new ones. These policies cover the areas of housing, infrastructure, transport and security, and 
include those already mentioned as present in and around Providência: the UPPs, UPP Social, 
Morar Carioca and Porto Maravilha. There are also major new transport policies, like the 
creation of a light-rail system covering the port and city centre, a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) 
network focussed on the west of the city, and an extension of the city metro, also to the west. 
Significant federal infrastructure and housing programmes such as the Programa de Aceleração 
do Crescimento (Growth Acceleration Programme, PAC) and Minha Casa Minha Vida (My 
House My Life, MCMV) are being carried out on a large scale in particular zones of the city. 
There have also been major redevelopments of the Maracanã football stadium, which hosted 
the 2014 World Cup final, and the Autódromo Nelson Piquet in Barra da Tijuca, which will be 
the site of the future Olympic Park (please see Figure 1). 
 
(Figure 1 about here.) 
 
The appearance of such an array of new policies and projects in a relatively short period of time 
has led many to see the interventions collectively as part of a wider strategy to transform the 
city: what the Comitê Popular da Copa e Olimpíadas (Popular Committee of the World Cup 
and Olympics) describes as an Olympics-driven “City Project” (Comitê Popular, 2013). While 
it is admittedly problematic to lump all of these policies together as a single initiative – for 
example, some were launched before Rio won the Olympic bid and others are only tenuously 
connected to Olympic development [ii] – there are several factors, we feel, that give these 
various interventions a strong degree of unity and coherence.  
 
First, although not all of these policies have been formulated or implemented in co-ordination 
with the others, there is a degree of institutional density and overlap that ensures that none is 
entirely separate from the rest. Second, these individual interventions have become increasingly 
focussed on delivering the mega-events. This has caused strategic priorities to shift, with some 
programmes being accelerated, others being shelved and many forced to co-ordinate their 
activities more intensely. And finally, perhaps the most significant reason for grouping all of 
these initiatives under the City Project banner relates to their political trajectories: to justify 
these different projects, Rio’s three tiers of government have mobilized a more-or-less identical 
discourse about the city’s history, its current problems, and the solutions that are required. This 
shared narrative has provided both the glue for Rio’s political alliance and the guiding principles 
that can be seen in the design of the policies themselves. In the next section we focus on the 
origins and development of this narrative, and then move on to consider a series of recent 
critiques that have been made against the City Project and its urban and social impacts.  
 
3) The “Post-Third World City” narrative 
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While the Post-Third World City narrative has essentially been a government discourse, it also 
overlaps with some more popular interpretations about changes needed to address security, 
housing, and transport challenges in the city. In order to understand its initial political strength, 
it is therefore necessary to situate the historical moment of the mid- to late-2000s in the broader 
context of Rio’s modern history. Both the diagnosis and prescription it offered for the city relate 
to the enduring physical and social legacies of two earlier and deeply formative historical 
periods. During both, Rio was seen as paradigmatic of problems emerging in cities across the 
Global South, or the “Third World”, as it was commonly referred to in the language of the time, 
and as contrasting sharply with conditions found in the so-called “First World”. 
 
The first of these periods was the era of rapid urbanisation, peaking in the 1950s when Rio’s 
population grew at an average rate of over 4% per year (Perlman, 2010: 55). Accelerating rural-
urban migration along with endogenous population growth overwhelmed the public authorities, 
which were unable to provide housing, infrastructure or services (including transport and 
policing) for large parts of the population. Unable to gain access to the formal housing market, 
much of this new population settled in favelas, which had a population growth rate of 10% per 
annum during the same decade (ibid.), and peripheral semi-formal subdivisions. Academics at 
the time theorized the “over-urbanisation” of cities across Latin America and the Third World, 
and the economic, social and cultural “marginality” of residents of informal areas (Perlman, 
2010: 147-64). Such ideas found political expression in favela removal campaigns carried out 
on a massive scale in Rio and other Third World cities during the 1960s and ‘70s. 
 
The second key period was the era of economic turmoil during the 1980s and ‘90s. During this 
time visible signs of urban dislocation became pervasive, including the degradation of public 
infrastructure and industrial areas like the Port Zone, and growing homelessness, 
unemployment, and informality (Gilbert, 1994). It also saw the emergence of heavily armed 
gangs who monopolized the city’s growing cocaine trade and established de facto control over 
many of its favelas. As rival factions competed for territory and Rio’s police adopted military-
style tactics for combating them, many urban boundaries became effectively militarized. This 
included wealthy areas, which were increasingly fortified behind gates guarded by private 
security firms (Caldeira, 2000). Academic and popular commentators interpreted this as a 
process of urban fragmentation, with Rio described as a “divided city” (Ventura, 1994) whose 
favelas were controlled by “parallel powers” (Leeds, 1996). These processes certainly bore 
greater resemblance to contemporary trends in First World cities, such as deindustrialisation 
and rising inequality and crime. However, both in the underlying causes of its problems (eg. 
debt crises, uncontrolled inflation, institutional weakness), and in the extremity of its symptoms, 
Rio de Janeiro once again became a paradigmatic case of issues affecting the cities of the Third 
World more generally. 
 
3a) Post-Third World discourses and policy influences 
 
As can be seen in the discourses surrounding the new urban policies, the City Project claims to 
respond to legacies of rapid urbanisation and urban fragmentation, primarily by promoting 
integration.[iii] The policies targeted at favelas, namely the UPPs, UPP Social and Morar 
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Carioca, are all presented as means for bringing about the physical, social and institutional 
integration of favelas with formal areas. For example, UPP Social’s website states that its 
objectives are to “promote urban, social and economic development in the (pacified) territories; 
and to execute the full integration of these areas with the city as a whole” (UPP Social). Morar 
Carioca, meanwhile, is described as a “social revolution” that will “re-urbanize and socially 
integrate all the city’s communities, until the year of 2020 [sic]” (Morar Carioca). The major 
transport interventions like the BRT, meanwhile, are conceived as means for integrating larger 
areas of the city to one another: “The (BRT) express corridors [.…] together with the light rail 
and other already existing means of transport will compose a new transport fabric 
interconnecting all the regions of the Olympic City”[iv] (Cidade Olímpica). 
 
These different processes of integration are, at the same time, presented as being catalysts for 
modernisation, whether this is referring simply to urban infrastructure or to the social and 
cultural life of the city more generally. This is particularly clear in the claims made for Porto 
Maravilha. The Porto Novo consortium that is carrying out the project argues the following: 
 
Returning a historical treasure to Rio, and at the same time integrating areas with great housing, 
cultural and economic potential, which will be transformed into an example of modernity [….] 
The revitalization of the port area in Rio de Janeiro will reintegrate it with the city center as an 
example of sustainable urban development and productive social inclusion (Porto Maravilha). 
 
The modernising discourse is seen in the way different policies are presented as embodying 
‘new approaches’ to old and seemingly intractable problems. Many of these have been adapted 
from policies developed elsewhere. For example, Porto Maravilha has clear echoes of 
waterside redevelopment strategies used by many European and North American cities 
(Gaffney, 2013: 10; Lehrer and Laidley, 2008). The most notable example in Rio’s case is the 
“Barcelona model” of using the Olympics to regenerate run-down, post-industrial areas. As has 
been widely noted, Catalan consultants promoting this model have been involved in Rio’s 
history of strategic planning and mega-events bids since the early 1990s (Vainer, 2009; Sanchez 
and Broudehoux, 2013: 133-34). The BRT system, meanwhile, builds on a model developed in 
South America itself: first in the southern Brazilian city of Curitiba and then significantly scaled 
up in Bogotá, Colombia with the creation of the Transmilenio system in 2000 (Peñalosa, 2014). 
Though Rio’s unique geography and urban landscape share few commonalities with cities in 
the Global North, Olympic planners appear to be drawing on past development models in hopes 
of achieving a similar transport legacy in Rio (Kassens-Noor, 2013).  
 
The favela-focussed policies also reveal an eclectic mix of influences and are similarly 
marketed on the basis of being “innovative”. For example, Morar Carioca builds upon the 
achievements of Rio’s Favela Bairro upgrading programme of the 1990s, though supposedly 
with greater sensitivity to specific local conditions through participatory planning processes 
and the favouring of architectural proposals that respond creatively to local infrastructure and 
mobility challenges. An example of the latter is the use of cable cars like the one being installed 
in Providência, which arrived in Rio as the result of a visit made by Governor Cabral to 
Colombia in 2007 (Freeman, 2012). In the city of Medellín the Metrocable system had been 
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installed in a historically excluded informal settlement under the administration of reformist 
Mayor Sérgio Fajardo. The prior military incursion that had “reclaimed” this territory from 
guerrilla forces and the city’s subsequent “return to legality” policing programme were also key 
inspirations for the UPPs (Gutierrez et al., 2013), although the latter also built on Rio’s own 
Group Policing in Special Areas (GPAE) programme which was piloted in the early 2000s 
(Melício et al., 2012).  
 
To sum up, the Post-Third World City agenda is a term that we employ in this article to describe 
an assemblage of policies and accompanying discourses constructed around a particular 
historical narrative. Specifically, the City Project is presented as an attempt to overcome the 
negative social and physical legacies of rapid urbanisation and urban fragmentation, which, it 
suggests, are the fundamental obstacles the city currently faces. It proposes to do so through 
innovative and locally sensitive policies that simultaneously upgrade and integrate different 
urban territories, with specific (though not exclusive) emphasis on the relationship between 
favelas and formal areas. Those innovative policies are frequently borrowed from other contexts 
where similar conditions or problems are deemed to prevail, or where it is believed that lessons 
and models can be effectively adapted to the Rio context. The presence of policy influences 
from ‘Northern’ (i.e., American and European) contexts reinforces the argument that the City 
Project is collapsing the old distinction between ‘First’ and ‘Third World’ cities as Rio de 
Janeiro enters a new modern era.  
 
4) Neoliberal urban governance, mega-events and the City of Exception thesis 
 
It is a testament to the descriptive power of the Post-Third World City narrative that it achieved 
a kind of ideological hegemony between its initial development in years 2007-09, and the 
explosion of opposition from community and broader social movements in 2013. Nonetheless, 
over this period a counter-narrative did emerge that began to tell quite a different story about 
both the origins and long-term impacts of the City Project. This set of ideas, which can broadly 
be called the City of Exception thesis, is mainly found in academic writing.[v] However, it has 
also percolated into the rhetoric of social movements and social media campaigning against 
mega-event policies (eg. Comitê Popular 2013). In this sense, although it is distinguished from 
the Post-Third World City narrative by both its greater intellectual depth and distance from 
government, the City of Exception thesis deserves to be seen as exercising influence beyond 
academic debates.  
 
The theoretical co-ordinates of the City of Exception thesis are mainly drawn from critical 
Marxist geography, though with some interesting departures specific to the Rio context. Thus, 
for Vainer and others, the long period of urban crisis during the decades of the 1980s and ‘90s 
is conceived as a process of disinvestment, with global capital shunning Rio in favour of other 
more lucrative territories.[vi] This created a growing “rent gap” (Smith, 1979) between potential 
and realized land uses in the city as a whole, and in some hard-hit areas like the Port Zone in 
particular. As a result, when economic prospects improved in the 2000s, capital began to return 
to the city, seeking returns via “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2003). That is to say 
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it sought to reclaim territories previously abandoned to lower value use, like favelas, other areas 
of low-income housing, and public spaces and facilities catering to their residents. 
 
At the level of urban governance, analysts also identify a significant transition during this 
period. In 1993 Rio’s Prefeitura (i.e., municipal government) signed into law the first strategic 
plan of any city in the Global South, in partnership with the city’s two leading private sector 
interest bodies (Vainer, 2011). Critics argue this marked the transition from a “managerial” to 
an “entrepreneurial” model of urban governance, with city authorities now focussed on 
competing for global capital flows rather than attempting to respond directly to the needs of 
residents (Ribeiro and Santos Junior, 2013; see also Harvey, 2001; Raco, 2014). Vainer (2011) 
describes the shift as the emergence of a new “hegemonic power bloc” of politicians and key 
business interests, including land developers. He argues that by mobilising a discourse of ‘urban 
emergency,’ this coalition was able, through a variety of semi-legal jurisdictions, to legally 
enshrine its own right to suspend legal norms and bypass political contestation in the ‘collective 
interest’ of the city.  
 
Vainer brings the argument up to date by incorporating in his model processes associated with 
Rio’s mid-decade mega-events. Following Georgio Agamben (2005), Vainer suggests that 
mega-events like the Olympics can be harnessed by States to subvert legal protocol. So 
momentous are mega-events in the eyes of State actors that ensuring their success can trump 
due processes of municipal, state, and federal law. Thus, for cities playing host to mega-events, 
a “state of exception” is created when the State ignores established laws in order to push through 
mega-event preparations. Examples in Rio de Janeiro include the forced removal of local 
residents from Olympic venue sites, bypassing environmental assessment and regulation, and 
authoritarian public security measures carried out in public space. For Vainer, such tactics have 
become so commonplace that a permanent “state of exception” has been created in Rio, now 
making it a “City of Exception.”  
 
These related processes of capital disinvestment/reinvestment and the shift from managerial to 
entrepreneurial governance may look familiar to critical accounts of neoliberalization processes 
in many other cities in the first decades of the twenty-first century. Indeed, researchers 
examining mega-events and mega-projects in other contexts have often arrived at similar 
conclusions (e.g., Haila, 2008; Lehrer and Laidley, 2008). In the City of Exception literature, 
however, two factors distinguish Rio as noteworthy (if not entirely unique). The first is that the 
ruling political coalition has placed a disproportionate strategic emphasis on attracting capital 
through the hosting of mega-events and attracting tourism more generally. The second is that 
many of the exceptional measures taken have had unusually extreme impacts on the city and 
some communities in particular. 
 
4a) Securitisation, social cleansing and pro-rich investment 
 
Much of the growing international literature on mega-events and their urban impacts dovetails 
neatly with the City of Exception thesis (Haila, 2008; Lehrer and Laidley, 2008; Poynter and 
Viehoff, forthcoming). In the case of global sporting events like the World Cup and Olympics, 
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special agreements are made between host countries/cities and the international sporting bodies 
to guarantee certain norms in areas such as branding rights, security and hospitality 
arrangements for the duration of the event (Gross, 2012). In more lasting ways, meanwhile, 
powerful entities with special legal status, like local organising committees and public-private 
partnerships of various kinds, are created to develop the new sporting and urban infrastructure 
that mega-events invariably require (Fainstein, 2008; Orueta and Fainstein, 2008). In many 
cases (and very clearly so in the case of Rio), these bodies become responsible for carrying out 
major, long-term transformations of the urban fabric while bypassing mainstream democratic 
institutions (Sanchez and Broudehoux, 2013: 135-36). In this sense, mega-events can act as 
catalysts both for creating urban “states of exception” and as a means of reforming the urban 
environment in the interests of powerful actors.  
 
In opposition to the claims of the Post-Third World City narrative – of expanded security and 
transport services, urban integration and pro-poor development – critics have thus identified 
processes of securitisation and social cleansing that are being carried out in the interests of rich 
and powerful private interest groups. Instead of modernising the city as claimed, some have 
identified the City Project as a step back towards Brazil’s authoritarian past, drawing parallels 
to the mass favela removal campaign carried out by the military dictatorship in the 1960s 
(Brum, 2013; Comitê Popular, 2013). 
 
Differently from cities in the Global North, where mega-events and mega-projects provide 
catalytic moments for repressive State tactics (Haila, 2008; Lehrer and Laidley, 2008; see also 
Frawley and Adair, 2013), such ‘opportunistic’ moments are not necessarily required in Rio 
and other similar cities. Heavy-handed police measures are common with or without the 
looming deadlines of mega-projects and events (Garmany, 2014). Nonetheless, there is an 
inglorious history of intensified State violence in Rio during periods of increased international 
attention. There has been a tendency for mega-event security requirements to drive 
militarisation, from the military occupation of the Complexo do Alemão favela complex during 
the 1992 Rio Environmental Summit, to the 2007 “PAN massacre” in the same location, when 
an estimated 19 people were killed in police operations coinciding with the Pan-American 
Games (Gaffney, 2010).  
 
With regard to pacification, the Comitê Popular argue that the programme is, in essence, a 
security strategy for the mega-events and the elite areas of the city where they will primarily 
take place (Comitê Popular, 2013: 82). Not all those pursuing the City of Exception line of 
argument would draw such a direct link. As stated previously, the UPP programme was 
unveiled prior to the Olympics announcement, and in any case mega-event arrangements cannot 
be the only determining factor, with other operational and political considerations also at play. 
Nonetheless, the securitisation of strategic parts of the city still fits into a broader underlying 
analysis about the socio-spatial logic of neoliberalisation. For example, Freeman (2012) argues 
that mega-events and pacification are connected in that they both result from the new dynamics 
of capitalist accumulation since Rio’s economic resurgence. Drug-trafficking gangs, he argues, 
have long dominated life in Rio’s favelas, but this problem has only been seriously addressed 
since it has come into conflict with “elite accumulation strategies" (Freeman, 2012: 97). The 
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implication is that pacification constitutes a repressive and arbitrary means of controlling favela 
populations that threaten the realisation of these strategies, rather than an attempt to extend 
norms of public policing to areas where they had previously been absent. 
 
Similar arguments have been developed regarding the equally contentious issue of favela 
removals. In 2013 the Comitê Popular estimated that over 4,000 families were under threat of 
removal,[vii] with close to 5,000 already evicted from their homes. They (Comitê Popular, 2013: 
19-20) and Brum (2013) point out that the majority of favela residents threatened by removal 
are concentrated along frontiers of elite regeneration and urbanisation processes in the centre 
and west of the city. In this respect the Olympic zones in Barra da Tijuca (the site of the Olympic 
Park) and the city centre (including Porto Maravilha and the Maracanã stadium) might be seen 
as exclusion zones that are being repurposed for the mega-events and the longer-term interests 
of capital: a future in which long-established favelas do not figure (see again Figure 1). Drawing 
on Smith’s (1996) concept of revanchist gentrification, Freeman (2012) interprets the repertoire 
of favela policies in these areas as a kind of ‘reclaiming’ of the city. He argues that for capital 
to achieve its aims in areas like the Port Zone, favelas must be removed, pacified, or otherwise 
‘symbolically tamed’ with highly visible modern infrastructure like cable-cars, that at once 
diminish their otherness, while exploiting Rio’s exotic image to create an enticing Olympic 
spectacle.  
 
As with security, housing, and infrastructure policy, many have also questioned the logic of the 
new transport interventions. Rio’s authorities emphasize that the principle extensions to the 
transport system are being targeted at currently underserved areas in the West Zone (metro 
extension and BRT), and also in the port area (light rail), with large low-income populations. 
Yet these are also the areas likely to experience major gentrification in coming years. 
Meanwhile, the greatest transport needs are focussed in the densely occupied North Zone and 
the sprawling suburbs and favelas of the Baixada Fluminense, which are being largely 
overlooked (Rodrigues, 2014). As a result, many have argued that, as with the UPPs, new 
transport initiatives are primarily aimed at the mega-events – facilitating the mobility of visitors 
between Olympics venues, tourist areas and the international airport – and not a serious strategy 
for easing Rio’s huge urban mobility problems (Comitê Popular, 2013). 
 
In summation, critics of the City Project strongly contest the official claims outlined in the 
previous section. They argue that UPPs are primarily a tactic for controlling favela populations 
that threaten elite accumulation strategies, rather than an attempt to extend public security and 
citizenship to territories where they have historically been denied. Similarly, they dispute that 
housing, infrastructure and transport policies are disinterestedly pursuing the goals of 
integration and development for the benefit of the population as a whole and the poorest in 
particular. Instead they contend that investment is primarily targeted at wealthy areas or 
otherwise designed to physically transform low-income territories so as to facilitate 
gentrification. Favelas standing in the way of such processes must, as a consequence, be 
securitized and symbolically tamed, or, even worse, removed from the urban landscape 
altogether. 
 
 12 
5) Discussion: A Post-Third World City or neoliberal City of Exception? 
 
Clearly the Post-Third World City narrative and the City of Exception thesis tell very different 
stories about both the origins and the impacts of the City Project. In part, this is because they 
must, by definition, speak in different registers. Proponents of the Post-Third World City 
narrative promote their policies based on “narratives of success,” adopting a discourse that all 
too readily drifts into unsubstantiated propaganda (Brownill et al., 2013: 113). The City of 
Exception thesis, by contrast, occupies the space where intellectual scrutiny and social protest 
intersect, and as a result tends towards critique and an emphasis on the “dark legacies” ignored 
by official discourse (ibid.). In this way it plays a vital corrective role, but can in some instances 
be unconstructive and even reductive in its criticism. Beyond these discursive aspects, however, 
there are more fundamental differences in the way the two narratives understand Rio de 
Janeiro’s history and current conjuncture. 
 
At the heart of the Post-Third World City narrative lies the concept of a “divided city” (Ventura, 
1994). Against this implicit framework it emphasizes geographically identifiable gaps in the 
provision of infrastructure and public services, both across the different regions of the city and 
in favelas generally. In this view both the State and the formal economy are seen as having been 
historically absent from large swathes of the city, allowing problems like drug trafficking to 
become entrenched. The implication is that Brazil’s economic upturn – and the new State 
activism emerging at different levels of government – presents an opportunity for expanding 
State services and formal economic activity to these areas. This highlights an important 
difference with mega-projects in the Global North, which are typically carried out in the name 
of revitalizing abandoned and run-down areas (Orueta and Fainstein, 2008). In cities like Rio 
de Janeiro, where large swaths of the city are characterized by informality and severe socio-
spatial exclusion, mega-projects have the slightly different rationale of establishing a 
formal/State presence in ‘un-colonized,’ disconnected parts of the city. 
 
The City of Exception literature tends to draw on a different theoretical tradition that dates back 
to debates over the role of the military regime in favela removals and other policies of “urban 
despoliation” in the 1960s and ‘70s (most notably Kowarick, 1980). This view, developed 
primarily by Brazilian urban sociologists, portrayed the State not as absent, but as an active 
agent in the production of urban inequalities through its wilful neglect and repression of low-
income populations. In simplified terms – unlike research in the Global North (e.g., Harvey, 
1973 Smith, 1979), which emphasized the predominate role of privately held capital – in Brazil 
the State was viewed as the proactive enforcement arm of the economic elite, holding down the 
cost of Brazil’s mass reserve army of labour and, where necessary, forcibly displacing it from 
valuable urban territory to facilitate capitalist accumulation.  
 
Current critiques draw on some of the core ideas of this literature, highlighting important 
parallels with the situation today (eg. Brum, 2013). They have challenged the view that the 
State is a neutral actor, identifying the many ways in which its policies benefit key interest 
groups, not least the construction firms and utility providers that directly benefit from huge 
State contracts and new markets. Even more importantly, the City of Exception literature 
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emphasizes the persistence of social, economic and political inequalities in shaping the design 
and implementation of the new policies. While the Post-Third World City narrative claims the 
urban reforms are utilitarian, or even pro-poor, the City of Exception literature points out that 
the primary benefactors are often elite interest groups and that low-income populations are 
suffering many negative impacts, including intensified policing and eviction. In these ways we 
believe the City of Exception literature offers a valid and incisive critique of the City Project.  
 
Despite its strengths, however, there are also certain problems and omissions within the City of 
Exception approach itself that must be explored if a fuller understanding is to be reached. In the 
remainder of the article we focus on three issues in particular. Firstly, we argue that elements 
of both complexity and coherence within the Brazilian State must be given a more central place 
in the analysis. Secondly, we highlight the role of Rio’s uneven geographical development and 
the significant variations in policy impacts that this produces. Thirdly, we believe that more 
effort must be made to distinguish between impacts that are the direct results of the policies we 
define as being part of the City Project and those that result from broader social transformations.  
 
5a) Complexity and continuity in the Brazilian State 
 
The first issue worthy of critique is the insufficient attention the City of Exception thesis gives 
to the internal workings of the Brazilian State. These touch upon broader questions about the 
applicability of neoliberalisation theory to the context of the urban Global South (see Roy 2009 
and 2011; Parnell and Robinson 2011). As explained previously, the range of policies connected 
to the City Project is highly diverse, involving different levels and departments of government 
as well as non-State actors. The complex and frequently contradictory interactions between 
these different bodies and policies result from the complex and contradictory nature of the 
Brazilian State itself. Ribeiro and Santos Junior (2013) point out that while the municipal 
government, particularly since the accession of Mayor Eduardo Paes in 2008, has pursued a 
recognisably neoliberal policy agenda, it is perfectly possible for this to co-exist with “neo-
Keynesian,” or neo-developmentalist, policies like PAC and MCMV at the federal level.[viii] At 
a deeper institutional level they offer a useful route forward by conceiving of the current urban 
coalition as a hegemonic, rather than unitary bloc. This encompasses multiple “grammars” of 
urban politics, such as corporatist, clientelist and patrimonialist structures, with which 
neoliberal actors must coexist and through which their policies must often be channelled. 
 
The conceptualisation of the City Project as a hegemonic project held together by pragmatic 
political alliances and a shared policy narrative (and in the context of a highly fragmented 
institutional setting) has other analytical benefits. Crucially, it helps to explain the participation 
of progressive State and civil society actors in the more pro-poor policies like Morar Carioca 
and UPP Social, and also why these programmes were progressively hollowed out as the 
neoliberal wing of the coalition grew in confidence after 2009. It also sheds light on the 
contrasting reactions of different political actors to the mass protests in Brazil in June-July 
2013, which in Rio were closely tied to opposition to the City Project.[ix] 
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Just as it reveals the complexity of the Brazilian State, however, the City Project also exhibits 
important aspects of uniformity and historical continuity. This is particularly visible in the 
treatment of favela residents. For example, Rodrigues draws parallels between the UPPs and 
related social and infrastructure policies and the various attempts of the developmentalist State 
of the 1950s and ‘60s to “civilize” favela residents (2013: 13-14). Viewed in this way, 
pacification comes to look less like a neoliberal policy aimed solely at protecting capital flows, 
and more like a hybrid neoliberal/neo-developmentalist policy that also seeks to draw favela 
populations into national development processes. Brum (2013), meanwhile, highlights 
important similarities between current favela removals and the mass removal campaigns of the 
1960s and ‘70s. Just as then, recent removals have resulted from co-ordinated action between 
the State and private interests, with support from the mainstream media and sections of the 
middle class (Brum, 2013: 199). Furthermore, although Rio’s Municipal Housing Secretariat 
(SMH) is controlled by the leftist Workers Party, it has been complicit in removal policies in 
favelas like Providência. Such evidence of cross-party consensus in pursuing large-scale favela 
removal is all the more surprising in that it follows a period when on-site upgrading seemed to 
have won the day. This suggests a disposition towards favela removal within the governing elite 
that, to some degree, transcends party ideology and persists in spite of long-term political and 
institutional transformations. 
 
In this light, it may be necessary to acknowledge aspects of a kind of Brazilian (or more 
accurately, perhaps, a Carioca) exceptionalism when analysing Rio’s City Project. This is most 
clearly visible in the way that globally mobile policies have been implemented and received 
compared to other contexts. For example, the UPP programme is supposedly based on 
principles of community policing, but has been given the name of “pacification” and is being 
carried out by a heavily armed military police force with exceptional powers and a history of 
abuse in favela territories. Likewise, cable cars and other new infrastructure have typically been 
installed in favelas with little or no consultation and frequently against the wishes of residents. 
This has led to a bizarre situation in which cable cars are widely resented in affected favelas 
and seen as cosmetic interventions designed to conceal persistent social problems from outside 
onlookers. By contrast, in Medellín, where they were first built, it was precisely that sense of 
symbolic inclusion that residents seem most to have valued, despite their practical and 
economic benefits being far less obvious (Brand and Dávila, 2011). Such cynicism among 
favela residents seem to reflect the long historical relationship in Rio between urban 
beautification projects and the removal and repression of low-income groups (see Abreu, 1987).  
 
These elements of, in the first instance, complexity and contestation, and in the second instance, 
continuity and consensus within the Brazilian State, support the argument that, when not 
applied with great care, urban neoliberalization theory can end up concealing as much as it 
reveals about cities of the Global South (Parnell and Robinson, 2012). Unlike in the Global 
North – where inequalities of capitalist development may often be tempered by State 
involvement (Fainstein, 2008) – in the Global South, greater State involvement by no means 
leads to more equal public benefits (see also Bezmez, 2008; Moncada, 2013). Yet on the other 
hand, the central role of the Brazilian State in processes of securitization and social cleansing 
and also in the provision of housing and infrastructure in lower-income areas makes it 
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problematic to label these policies collectively as “neoliberal”. Therefore, while we do not 
dispute that there has been a process of neoliberalization of urban governance during Rio’s 
Olympic Era, this must be placed in the context of a complex State structure in which – for both 
political and deeper institutional reasons – neoliberalism must inevitably coexist with other 
logics of governance and power. 
 
5b) Uneven development 
 
Following on from questions surrounding the role of the State, a second area in need of scrutiny 
concerns the ways in which Rio’s unusually complex physical and social geographies confound 
any assumptions of uniform policy impacts across the urban territory. While the imbalanced 
macro-geographies of urban interventions have been discussed – eg. in the spatial distribution 
of UPPs, favela removals and new transport networks – this unevenness also plays out in less 
predictable ways at a more local scale. This has created relative winners and losers even 
amongst the favela communities and other low-income populations identified by the City of 
Exception thesis as the primary victims of Rio’s urban transformation. These variations are 
fundamental to understanding the different ways the City Project has been experienced locally 
and the varying attitudes this has generated across the city. Two examples from different parts 
of the city serve to illustrate this point.[x] 
 
Perhaps the most high-profile and symbolic case of a removal process associated with Rio’s 
mega-events concerns favela Vila Autódromo in Barra da Tijuca. Autódromo lies on the edge 
of the Lagoa de Jacarepaguá, next to the old Autódromo de Nelson Piquet racetrack, which will 
become the site of the new Olympic Park (see again Figure 1). Although the community was 
granted an official certificate of possession in the 1990s, and despite the initial architects’ 
design of the Olympic Park not requiring evictions, Mayor Paes has shown a determination to 
remove Vila Autódromo, supposedly to ensure accessibility to the Olympic Park (Brum, 2013: 
200). This has led to a drawn-out (and at the time of writing still unresolved) struggle with local 
residents who are resisting eviction. Similar threats hang over several small favelas a short 
distance to the north in Jacarepaguá, which lie on the route projected for the TransOlímpica 
BRT bus route (Rio On Watch, 2014). 
 
In stark contrast to these cases, Asa Branca, a larger favela just one kilometre to the north of 
Vila Autódromo has had a far more positive experience (see Richmond, forthcoming). It 
received a major upgrading from the Prefeitura at the end of 2012, bringing paved streets, drains 
and streetlighting. Although carried out through the small Bairro Maravilha programme, rather 
than Morar Carioca or PAC, residents see the belated arrival of the State as a direct result of 
the Olympics and the greater attention this has directed towards favelas in the west of the city. 
The upgrading was certainly not participatory and was attained through traditional clientelist 
lobbying of the Prefeitura. Indeed, Asa Branca was due to receive a more comprehensive 
redevelopment from Morar Carioca, but now seems unlikely to, given the doubts surrounding 
the programme (ibid.). Nonetheless, it is not accurate to say that they have suffered directly 
from the mega-events, and indeed many residents would view their impact positively. What is 
perhaps more telling, as we explain in the next section, is that many residents believe that rather 
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than the mega-events themselves, the uncontrolled speculative development unfolding in the 
surrounding area will ultimately threaten the community’s survival, not in the lead-up to 2016, 
but in the years that follow. 
 
Another example of uneven impacts concerns the area surrounding the Maracanã stadium, 
where three favelas have been affected by the City Project in very different ways (Richmond, 
forthcoming). The smallest and closest to the stadium, Favela do Metrô, has been subjected to 
a long and painful eviction process similar to that occurring in Vila Autódromo (Rio On Watch, 
2013). There too the justifications for removal have continually been changed and the municipal 
government adopted a similar divide-and-rule strategy, making conditional offers of alternative 
housing that resulted in some residents being removed to distant locations. Residents who 
remained were left to live in a partially demolished neighbourhood that attracted new invasions 
from homeless squatters and drug users, as well as vermin. By contrast, Mangueira, a large 
hillside favela visible from the stadium and widely known for its historic samba school, has 
received large investments in monumental infrastructure and new housing through PAC as well 
as social programmes. Finally, Tuiuti, a little-known, medium-sized favela that is slightly 
further away and less visible has been overlooked by the City Project altogether.  
 
In both the environs of the Olympic Park and the area surrounding the Maracanã, the policies 
of the City Project have been implemented very unevenly, even over very small distances. As 
argued by Freeman (2012: 106-9), this appears to be partly the result of plans to remould the 
surroundings of the key event venues to create a global spectacle. In the case of Favela do Metrô 
and Vila Autódromo, their proximity to the respective venues means that they must be removed 
in order to project the desired global image of the city. By contrast, Mangueira’s size and profile 
mean that removal is unviable, so spectacle can best be produced through monumental 
infrastructure that “symbolically transforms Mangueira from a dangerous threatening place into 
an exotic background” (Freeman, 2012: 108). Tuiuti, meanwhile, is far enough away that it is 
essentially invisible and requires no symbolic adjustment. However, spectacle does not account 
for Asa Branca’s upgrading, which will not be visible to the public. To understand the timing 
of its upgrading it is necessary to turn to more run-of-the-mill questions of how favela 
communities access policies through clientelist networks. Namely, while it is unlikely Asa 
Branca would have been upgraded without the Olympics, there was also no guarantee upgrading 
would have happened without effective political manoeuvring by its residents association.  
 
A final point relating to uneven impacts concerns the way that variation in local social 
conditions can influence the perceived local effectiveness of policies. The one significant policy 
that has been implemented in Tuiuti was the arrival of the UPP Mangueira-Tuiuti in late-2011 
(Richmond, forthcoming). As in most cases, pacification failed to evict the local Comando 
Vermelho (CV) drug trafficking faction, instead simply driving it underground. This has created 
complications for residents who are still subject to trafficker influence. Nonetheless, many 
residents view pacification as a qualified improvement, largely due to its effects of reducing the 
visibility of arms and drug dealing in the neighbourhood. Whereas in other favelas stop-and-
search procedures and arbitrary detainment have been widely used, and police and traffickers 
have engaged in shoot-outs, the social situation in Tuiuti since pacification has been relatively 
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calm. This is because, unlike larger favelas and those more strategically important for the drugs 
trade, Tuiuti did not experience major conflict between factions, and only infrequent police 
incursions prior to pacification. In favelas like Tuiuti, the UPP programme’s primary aims of 
reducing gang-related violence without alienating the community seems to be more achievable 
than elsewhere, even if the more expansive aims of ending trafficking and guaranteeing 
residents’ citizenship rights remain elusive. 
 
These examples emphasize the highly uneven ways in which current policies unfold across 
urban space. They suggest that while Vainer’s (2011) critique may offer a useful broad-brush 
understanding of such processes, greater nuance is needed when analysing specific empirical 
contexts. Logics of securitization and spectacle are clearly at play, yet they overlay pre-existing 
dynamics that can be decisive in determining where mega-event policies are implemented and 
with what consequences. Rather than exhibiting a singular and uniform mode of ‘exception’ 
throughout the entire city or even within special “Olympic Zones,” this suggests that there are 
in fact multiple and varying ‘states of exception’ that operate at different intensities and 
according to different geographies. As the examples of Asa Branca’s upgrading or Tuiuti’s 
relatively unobtrusive process of pacification suggest, it may be that deeper institutional power 
networks can themselves provide states of exception from states of exception. In this way, it 
may be useful to shift our understanding from a “territorial imagination of cores and 
peripheries” to one of “fractal geometries”, in which different systems of power interact across 
the city (Roy, 2011: 233). 
 
5c) Social change 
 
A final point to consider is how far the City Project departs from social trends already unfolding 
in Rio and other Brazilian cities regardless of the mega-events. Once again, the question of 
housing provides the clearest case for this. As discussed above, perhaps the most contested 
interventions of the City Project are those that supposedly necessitate the removal of favela 
residents. These cases are numerous and fit neatly with the City of Exception thesis, due in 
large part to the role mega-events play in creating a political climate conducive to the exercise 
of eminent domain. However, State-led favela removal is simply the most obvious 
manifestation of a much more extensive reorganisation effort within Rio and other cities under 
the dual dynamics of gentrification and suburbanisation (Gaffney, 2013).  
 
As shown by the FIPE-ZAP index, the housing market across central Rio de Janeiro has boomed 
in recent years fuelling gentrification, rent squeezes and, frequently, displacement (FIPE-
ZAP).[xi] This has affected all levels of the market, most dramatically in favourably located 
favelas like Vidigal and Santa Marta and central working-class neighbourhoods like Lapa and 
Cidade Nova, but also middle-class and elite areas in the South Zone (Gaffney, 2013). Besides 
its direct role in driving gentrification in the Port Zone, the City Project has indirectly bolstered 
speculative investment and pushed up house prices through pacification and infrastructure 
investments (Frischtak and Mandel, 2012). Thus the mega-events seem primarily to have 
oriented and accelerated gentrification processes rather than producing them ex nihilo. Brazil’s 
continued economic growth in the aftermath of the global downturn and the apparent promise 
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held out by Rio’s oil economy made the city’s prime property an attractive asset. In the context 
of weak institutional and legal architecture for combating property speculation, such conditions 
were always likely to produce dynamics of this kind, although in the absence of the Olympics 
the process would certainly have been slower and less geographically co-ordinated (Rolnik, 
2013).  
 
The gentrification of central areas is paralleled by the suburbanisation of lower-income groups, 
through both the property market and government policy. The huge federal social housing 
programme Minha Casa Minha Vida (MCMV), although “neo-Keynesian” (Ribeiro and Santos 
Júnior, 2013) in design, has an underlying market logic dictating that the vast majority of units 
must be built at the urban periphery where land values are cheapest (Cardoso et al., 2011). 
Along with the different forms of gentrification occurring in central areas, this is encouraging 
a broad dynamic of social segregation at the city level. A third dynamic, however, blurs the 
picture somewhat: rising purchasing power at the lower end of Rio’s income scale, primarily 
thanks to job growth and an activist federal minimum wage policy (Rodrigues, 2013). This and 
increasing access to credit have created more demand for suburban housing within the private 
sector and made the periphery itself more socially diverse. 
 
These different processes – gentrification, suburbanisation, and the diversification of peripheral 
areas – are also visible in other Brazilian cities and therefore cannot be reduced solely to the 
impact of the mega-events. As such they contradict the implicit claim of the City of Exception 
thesis that mega-events and the state of exception are crucial ingredients for social cleansing in 
Rio de Janeiro. Instead the city’s reorganization along more segregated lines appears to be a 
longer-term process, resulting from both its shifting position within the global capitalist 
economy and the (in some cases contradictory) social and geographical effects of federal 
housing and income-support policies. 
 
6) Conclusion 
 
This paper has argued that Rio de Janeiro’s City Project is a loosely connected set of urban 
policies designed and implemented by a diverse range of State and non-State actors in coalition. 
This coalition was sustained under the hegemony of a neoliberal municipal leadership, and 
mobilized what we describe as a Post-Third World City narrative. This offered a particular 
account of the city’s history – specifically emphasising the negative legacies of rapid 
urbanisation and urban fragmentation – and proposed a set of ‘innovative’ policy proposals for 
overcoming them. However, this narrative came to be challenged by a competing account of 
the City Project proposed by academic analysts and social movements, broadly defined here as 
the City of Exception thesis (Vainer 2011). This thesis proposes that rather than acting on behalf 
of the population as a whole, and historically excluded groups in particular, the new policies 
are using upcoming mega-events to create a “state of exception” (Agamben, 2005) so as to 
securitize and socially cleanse key strategic areas in pursuit of narrow private and elite interests. 
  
Our stance in this article, on one hand, is that the City of Exception thesis provides an insightful 
critique of the Post-Third World City narrative. In particular, it identifies continuing patterns of 
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socio-economic inequality that characterize Rio’s urban development. On the other hand, 
however, we argue that it fails to provide a full account of both the origins and impacts of the 
City Project or of the various changes currently unfolding in Rio. For example, it struggles to 
account for similar processes of urban exclusion and State aggression prior to both processes 
of neoliberalization and to the “state of exception” provided by the mega-events, or for the 
implementation of “neo-Keynesian” policies during the Olympic era. To achieve this level of 
analytical nuance, we believe greater attention must be paid to the complexities and 
idiosyncrasies of the Brazilian State, to the uneven urban geographies of policy impacts, and to 
the interaction between policy and broader social change in Brazil.  
 
Our exploration of these questions squares with broader concerns in the literature about both 
the role of mega-events in urban development processes and of the different theoretical 
frameworks needed for analysis of cities in the Global North and South. We have argued that 
important differences exist in the ways that mega-events and mega-projects are undertaken in 
cities like Rio de Janeiro. Unlike in the Global North, where such processes are often carried 
out under the banner of urban revitalization, in countries like Brazil the intent is more often to 
formalize informal space and take control of under-governed areas. Such tendencies offer a 
critique to mega-project analyses that suggest higher levels of State involvement often lead to 
increased public benefits (e.g., Fainstein, 2008): unlike in cities of the Global North, State 
oversight appears in many instances to worsen the social effects of mega-projects in Rio and 
other cities in the Global South (e.g., Bezmez, 2008; Parnell and Robinson, 2012). As Eduardo 
Moncada shows (2013), rapid urban redevelopment in such contexts may also produce ample 
opportunities for illicit and criminal networks, blurring the lines between formal and informal 
growth and helping, perhaps, to explain recent spikes in violence in many developing cities (see 
also Abello-Colak and Guarneros-Meza, 2014). This contributes to research that critically 
challenges the relationship between the State, neoliberalism, and globalisation (e.g., Robinson, 
2011), and responds to calls for nuanced theoretical analyses of non-Western cities (e.g., Roy, 
2009; 2011).  
 
Still to be considered are a multitude of urban (re)development processes linked to mega-events 
and networks of globalisation. As Vainer (2011) and others point out, events like the Olympics 
can provide pivotal moments whereby urban transformation is not only fast and undemocratic, 
but also where changes to governance and processes of capitalist accumulation can be profound 
and longstanding. According to Mike Raco (2014), pressure to ‘deliver’ mega-events may in 
fact represent a fundamental change in State governance and function in the twenty-first 
century. Juan Pablo Galvis (2014) provides further insight from Latin America, showing how 
emergent community governance efforts work to further exclude marginalized groups from 
public space. Understanding these processes – and how they manifest in rapidly developing 
countries like Brazil – will be increasingly important for making sense of urban development 
and change in coming years. We hope this article contributes to these discussions, and helps to 
encourage critical perspectives useful for unravelling the connections between urbanisation, 
capitalist development, neoliberal governance, and processes of globalisation.  
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Notes 
 
 
 
 
i Authors’ own translation 
ii In addition to being implemented at different timescales and for different motivations, many 
policies are administered at separate levels and by individual government departments, each 
with its own aims, remit, budget and modus operandi. For further explanation, please see 
Sanchez and Broudehoux (2013). 
iii The official promotional video of the UPP programme, ‘UPP came to stay,’ gives a clear 
account of the Post-Third World City narrative of Rio’s history. See 
http://www.upprj.com/index.php/as_upps_us (accessed 11 March 2014). 
iv Authors’ translation. 
v Aside from Vainer (2011), other papers broadly following the city of exception analysis 
include Freeman (2012), Gaffney (2010), Sanchez and Broudehoux (2013) and Comitê Popular 
(2013; 2014). Although they expand upon or diverge from the analysis in important ways, 
Ribeiro and Santos (2013), Brum (2013), Brownill et al. (2013) and Rodrigues (2013) adopt a 
broadly similar approach. 
vi  See Freeman (2012) for a detailed application of this theoretical model to Rio. 
vii Although calculations are extremely difficult given the authorities’ lack of transparency. 
viii As explained by Klink and Keivani (2013), even this distinction does not fully explain the 
idiosyncratic tendencies of spatial development in Brazil in the twenty-first century. 
ix Whereas President Dilma Rouseff expressed sympathy with the protestors, Sérgio Cabral and 
Eduardo Paes vehemently attacked them. 
x These examples are based on qualitative research carried out in 2013 and are outlined in 
greater depth in Richmond (forthcoming). 
xi Prices in peripheral areas have risen much less rapidly, and in some cases barely at all. 
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